Natural England

Foot and mouth disease: lessons to be learned (AP02/03)

FOR DECISION

Background

1. The Countryside Agency has been deeply involved in work associated with the impact of foot and mouth disease. We have concentrated particularly on the future of farming and land management. We have used opportunities such as our involvement in the work of the Rural Task Force and the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food to influence future policy directions.

2. We have now been asked to take a backwards look as well. One of the suite of Government inquiries and reports into the foot and mouth disease outbreak includes that of "Lessons to be Learned", which is now assembling evidence under the chairmanship of Dr Iain Anderson, formerly of Unilever plc. Dr Anderson has asked for views to be submitted by 15th March 2002 and expects to report his findings by "mid 2002."

3. The terms of reference for the Inquiry are:

4. The Board briefly discussed the nature of our involvement in the Lessons to be Learned Inquiry in September 2001 (AP 01/33). Based on the Board's conclusions, and its advice that our involvement should be of a 'minor' nature, we have chosen to concentrate on four topics for which we can claim some expertise. In doing so, we recognise that there are other important lessons to be learned but that other bodies are better qualified to advise on them.

The Countryside Agency's submission

5. Our submission is attached at Annex 1. We base the submission on the fundamental lesson that an outbreak of foot and mouth disease cannot be seen as an agricultural problem in isolation, and that control measures must be based on the well-being of rural areas as a whole. We have also set out a series of more detailed lessons, that:

• elements of the economy are interdependent, and that problems seen as purely 'agricultural' with solutions designed accordingly will swiftly affect (and often damage) a wide range of interconnected businesses - including those with no obvious links with farmers or farming;  

• the maintenance or reintroduction of local supply chains will benefit local economies as well as helping to contain the spread of contagious diseases;  

• the consequences of a wholesale closure of public rights of way have been damaging to the economic well-being of rural areas - especially those with a high dependence on tourism;  

• support for those communities and individuals affected was often inadequate.  

Recommendation

6. The Board is recommended to approve the Countryside Agency's submission (in Annex 1) to Dr Iain Anderson's Inquiry into the Lessons to be Learned from the foot and mouth disease outbreak.

January 2002

File ref: 15164

Annex 1

AN INQUIRY INTO THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE 2001 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK

A submission by the Countryside Agency

Introduction

1. The outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001 had a devastating effect on the countryside, extending far beyond those farmers and agricultural enterprises directly affected by the disease to include almost the whole rural business sector and many rural communities, too.

2. The previous major visitation of foot and mouth disease in 1967 was seen primarily as an agricultural problem and the measures then put into place to ensure its eradication were designed to protect and support the agricultural economy. The countryside, however, has changed markedly in the intervening decades with new forms of rural living and employment, a growth in leisure and tourism, and an associated shift in what the public expects from its rural acres.

3. In other words, from a wide range of social, economic and environmental viewpoints, the countryside is now about far more than farming, yet the measures introduced by the Government in the early stages of the recent outbreak were essentially the same as those employed in 1967 and geared to protecting the agricultural sector - at the expense, if necessary, of other interests.

4. The Countryside Agency is pleased to submit evidence to the Lessons to be Learned Inquiry, which we set out as five lessons to be learnedand associated action points for the Government. The Agency's views are restricted to lessons to be learned in the English countryside although they might well apply to other parts of the United Kingdom, too.

Lessons to be learned

A fundamental lesson

5. Our views are all set in the context of the fundamental 'lesson' that an outbreak of foot and mouth disease cannot be seen as an agricultural problem in isolation, and that control measures must be based on the well-being of rural areas as a whole.

6. Action point: Government contingency plans should have widespread endorsement across all relevant government departments.

The elements of the economy are interdependent. 

7. Foot and mouth disease has sharply emphasised the growing awareness that rural economic sectors and activities are interdependent. The vitality of a farming enterprise, for example, will have a direct effect on agricultural suppliers and services 'upstream' (fertiliser distributors, machinery sales etc.), and will also impact on spending 'downstream'. This is well understood but foot and mouth disease has also shown the importance of a managed landscape to recreation and tourism industries - and the importance of those industries, in turn, to a host of rural service and retail businesses.

8. Because of this, it is no longer possible to embrace the idea of a self-contained 'rural' or 'agricultural' economy (if indeed it ever was). Most rural businesses are strongly interdependent, and that interdependence also extends to urban areas. For example, adverse publicity associated with foot and mouth disease control measures is judged to have affected international tourism even in the heart of London and other big cities.

9. A crisis for one part of the economy will automatically result in crises for others unless solutions are pitched widely. Foot and mouth disease has reinforced the view that:

• problems seen as purely 'agricultural' with solutions designed accordingly will swiftly affect (and often damage) a wide range of interconnected businesses - including those with no obvious links with farmers or farming;  

• while the idea of a 'rural economy' is long past, the nature and dynamics of rural economies are not yet fully understood;  

• the financial implications of the foot and mouth disease outbreak have borne more heavily on a wide range of non-farming rural businesses than on the farming sector itself;

• a high quality landscape is of vital importance to the tourism sector and its growing number of visitors; and it also underpins and adds value to a range of non-tourist rural businesses, too;  

• when a crisis like foot and mouth disease removes the ability of a farmer to farm, there is too often no other activity to fall back upon. By broadening the range of products (market and non-market) from the farm, the farmer will be providing more of what the nation wants as well as protecting the business. Areas with a narrow economic base, particularly the remote pastoral areas heavily dependent on farming and tourism, have suffered the most;  

• Increasing global trade makes the country potentially vulnerable to imported diseases.  

10. The use of vaccination as a control measure for foot and mouth disease was fiercely contested throughout the outbreak and largely rejected so that disease-free status could be regained at the earliest opportunity.  Two lessons associated with vaccination policy are important in this context: 

• we need to reach consensus on the circumstances in which vaccination might be appropriate in a future outbreak;  

• vaccination policy has been seen as a scientific or agricultural issue, whereas a much broader range of interests must now be taken into account.  

The Countryside Agency is of the view that emergency vaccination should be part of any future policy for dealing with foot and mouth outbreaks the reasons for this view and our proposals for dealing with any new outbreaks are included in the Appendix to this submission. 

• 11. Action points: the Government should: 

• ensure that emergency planning generally (not just for foot and mouth disease) takes account of economic and social impacts on the whole countryside;  

• assess the impacts of future disease control measures on individual business sectors, and adjust them accordingly (and rapidly) when they start to affect other sectors adversely;  

• enlist the support of the Tourism Forum in keeping the needs of rural tourism on the agenda;  

• encourage more sustainable land management rather than purely agricultural production: government strategies and policies are needed to define future directions for profitable farming, accepting that less land will be used primarily for food production in the future, and that alternative land uses will include crops for industry and energy, conservation, recreation and community benefits;  

• review the policy of maintaining foot and mouth-free status at all costs.   

Local supply chains will benefit local economies as well as helping to contain the spread of contagious diseases. 

12. Stock farming has always involved the movement of animals (from upland to lowland pastures, for instance) but the nature of stock dealing has changed in recent years to favour much larger, regional markets with animals often being transported many miles between farm and market and market and farm.

13. These trends make the country more susceptible to contagious diseases and involve animal welfare issues, too. The Countryside Agency acknowledges both these points but it does not have the expertise to comment further. Rather, the lesson to be learned form our point of view is that the sort of localised supply chain that we are promoting with increasing vigour, with its locally sourced food and local markets, will help address these points as well as benefiting local economies.

14. Action points: the Government should:

• encourage forms of livestock farming more geared to the domestic market which, by stimulating domestic demand for high quality UK produced meat, would reduce stock movements and lessen risks of spreading disease;  

• co-ordinate activity across Government and its agencies and the commercial sector to increase the proportion of food sourced and processed locally;  

• address the regulatory costs that have made many local abattoirs uneconomic. Closures have concentrated activity on larger, often more distant abattoirs leading to longer distance stock movements and an increased risk of spreading contagious diseases. Further abattoir closures must be avoided and we believe that there is a good case for incentives to encourage the re-establishment of local abattoirs.  

The consequences of a wholesale closure of public rights of way have been damaging to the well-being of rural areas - especially those with a high dependence on tourism. 

15. The extensive public rights of way network in England has deep historic roots but its present use is primarily for recreation. Many paths have become important to the enjoyment of visitors - notably the National Trail and recreational trail networks. In the early days of the foot and mouth disease outbreak, the Government, on the policy advice then available, required a general closure of rights of way. Most local authorities acted swiftly to do so, even those in areas where the risk of disease transmission was slight. A sympathetic public stayed away from the countryside.

16. The rigid application of this policy very quickly showed that closing the countryside to visitors had dire effects on many rural businesses, and measures were introduced to reopen rights of way based on assessments of veterinary risk. Paths were opened at a slow place to start with but the injection of £3.8 million government grant funding through the Countryside Agency increased the rate of reopening considerably. This grant scheme was used to establish mitigating measures designed to reduce the risk of spreading the disease, and to provide information to the public.

17. The Agency has concluded that:

• we need to understand better the risk of walkers' spreading foot and mouth disease: many local authorities used the precautionary approach of keeping all rights of way closed simply because they could not properly assess the risk of doing otherwise. The onus of proof should be changed to embrace the assumption that rights of way will remain open unless there is a compelling case for closing them;  

• Ÿ measures that can close paths overnight but do not allow them to be reopened equally swiftly are not in the best in interests of the countryside;
• Ÿ the foot and mouth outbreak showed that the public were reluctant to return to the countryside because they were unsure of what paths were open and what welcome they would receive;

• we must understand better  the contribution of public rights of way to local economies, both in general and within specific geographical areas: this knowledge should be used in any future outbreaks of contagious diseases as part of a far more sophisticated method of assessing those paths that could be closed with few effects, and those which generate significant local income.  

• 18. Action points: the Government should:
• Ÿ accept that its guidance to local authorities on managing rights of way in the light of foot and mouth disease was ambiguous in places, thus allowing wide interpretation which often delayed action to reopen paths at the local level: clearer guidance is required and should be prepared now;
• Ÿ review the Foot and Mouth Disease Order 1983 at the earliest opportunity;
• Ÿ provide good public information in any future disease outbreak on the availability of public rights of way;
• Ÿ provide funding for the proposed national access database, which would deliver readily accessible and up to date information through the Internet on the availability of rights of way.  

Support for communities affected by foot and mouth disease was often inadequate

19. The Countryside Agency played a valuable roll in helping to alleviate the personal hardship and stress suffered by individuals and communities as a result of the foot and mouth disease outbreak. On behalf of the Government we operated a funding scheme which matched pound for pound public donations to charities and voluntary organisations to be used for the relief of hardship and distress. Donations amounted to almost £15 million, making £30 million in all with our contribution. We also administered similar schemes in Wales and Northern Ireland in partnership with the devolved administrations.

21. From this work, and from information through our existing networks with the voluntary sector, the following lessons can be drawn:

• the disease impacted on the wider community, not only farmers, as movement was restricted and people became wary of unnecessary journeys, stopped going to the local pub or visiting friends or going to church or club meetings. Children were kept away from school. In the Northern Fells area of Cumbria, for example, all meetings, events and community activities were cancelled. This affected the ability of local groups to raise funds or provide services: national voluntary organisations were affected in a similar way;  

• family incomes were affected, not only by the loss of farm business, but because those working off the farm were also laid off. This deepened financial worries;  

• national and local voluntary organisations responded quickly to the challenge, diverting from their planned activities to provide a range of advice, information, support and counselling to all those affected by the disease. Doctors, vets, school teachers and the clergy, among others, also played an important role in alleviating the stress caused to individuals.  

22. Action point: the Government should recognise the contribution made by the voluntary sector and the financial impact this has had. It should plan now to be ready to support voluntary organisations to enable them to take on a similar role within communities should there be another outbreak of contagious stock disease.

Countryside Agency

January 2002

Appendix to Countryside 

Agency submission to FMD 

Inquiry

DEALING WITH A FUTURE OUTBREAK OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE

The need for a new policy approach

A much broader range of interests must be taken into account when considering future policy for dealing with foot and mouth outbreaks, because the disease has impacts beyond agriculture. Costs to the UK economy as a whole from the 2001 outbreak have been estimated at 0.3% to 0.5% of GDP (£2.4 - £4.1 billion), which should be compared to £550 million as the value of lost meat exports.

It is also difficult to see the public again accepting a policy of mass slaughter and the widespread killing of healthy animals.

Effective commercial vaccines against foot and mouth disease are now available in quantity, as are new PCR tests which can distinguish between infected and vaccinated livestock. PCR tests also allow the virus to be rapidly typed, with results in two to three hours.

These points indicate that vaccination should be a part of any future strategy for dealing with foot and mouth outbreaks.

We are referring to emergency vaccination as a short term response in order to rapidly bring any outbreak under control and to achieve eradication through post vaccination surveillance and control activities. We are not talking about prophylactic vaccination.

Dealing with a new outbreak

In the event of a future outbreak, we propose the following course of action

• Immediately (on day one) use the PCR tests to type the virus
• Impose national movement restrictions on all livestock at risk
• Vaccinate all livestock within a defined distance of the outbreak, which might be 10 to 20km. Further work is needed to determine the optimum size of the ring
• All infected livestock to be slaughtered within 24 hours, and preferably earlier in the case of pigs where the virus is rapidly spread by exhalation 
• Isolate infected farms and apply strict biosecurity measures on all such farms. New guidance is needed on biosecurity measures and should be sent to all farmers and associated businesses
• DEFRA vets to trace all infectious contacts from affected herds  

Other points

There is no evidence that walkers on footpaths have ever caused spread of foot and mouth disease. As a principle, footpaths should remain open unless a significant risk can be shown. DEFRA need to develop risk assessment techniques which should include factors relating to the non-agricultural economy of the region.

Vaccinated animals which come in contact with infection rarely develop the disease or shed virus in milk. This has important implications for rural activities. After 14 days from vaccination of a herd/ flock there is no reason to restrict walkers. Thus, rights of way within in the vaccinated ring should only be closed (or public events cancelled) for a limited period after a proper scientific risk assessment.

There is no evidence that wildlife have spread the disease, e.g. deer.

There should be no question of waiting for a threshold of spread of the disease to be reached before vaccinating. The purpose of ring vaccination is to control any spread of the disease as quickly as possible.

With the introduction and proven effectiveness of the 3ABC marker-tests, it will be possible to test after 14 days for animals which might have contracted the disease as opposed to merely having antibodies from the vaccine present in their blood. Any animal which has been infected should be slaughtered, but there would be no need to slaughter the rest of the flock or herd

AEU rules need to be changed to allow meat from infected animals to be sold for consumption in the same way as meat is allowed to be imported into the UK from countries which have endemic foot and mouth disease.

There is no evidence of consumer resistance to buying meat from vaccinated animals, and there is no case for labelling.